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Abstract 
Few private defined benefit pension plans commit to indexing benefits after a worker begins 
receiving them. Previous (now dated) research found that most plans did, nonetheless, make 
"voluntary" adjustments, which compensated for roughly 40 percent of the price increases 
experienced since retirement. In analyzing changes in pension benefits reported by HRS 
respondents between 1994 and 2008, I find annual increases that are about one third of the 
increase in the CPI. The increases are concentrated among respondents who report that their 
benefits are adjusted for inflation. They are larger for workers in public administration than in 
other industries; perhaps surprisingly, they are not larger in jobs covered by union contracts than 
those in the non-union sector. The HRS data also show that benefits paid out of defined 
contribution plans increased, again by roughly one third of the increase in consumer prices. 
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  A member of the original HRS cohort who retired at about the time of her first interview 
at age 62 would now be 80 years old.  Her Social Security benefit would have increased just over 
50% in nominal terms, keeping its real value constant.  If she retired with a defined benefit (DB) 
pension that was indexed to the CPI, her monthly pension check would now be 50% larger, too. 
But most DB pensions are not formally linked to the CPI, or any other index.  If her nominal 
benefits were not adjusted at all, her pension check would now be worth about two thirds of its 
value in 1992.   
Inflation matters for present values as well as for annual benefits, though the growing 
impact of inflation is offset by declining probabilities of surviving to experience such misfortune.  
Nevertheless, for a single worker retiring at age 62, with a 2.9% real interest rate and a modest 
2.8% rate of inflation (Board of Trustees (2009)), indexing increases the expected present value 
of benefits received by 21% for men and 23% for women.   
Understanding how such adjustments are made – or are not made – using data from the 
actual experiences of HRS respondents will allow researchers to assess whether the substantial 
cumulative effects of even moderate inflation rates are being realized or offset. 
Previous Research 
  Some DB pensions – mostly in the public sector – are indexed to the CPI, and many 
others are adjusted even though the employer has no legal obligation to do so.   Allen, Clark, and 
Sumner (1984, 1986) studied post-retirement benefit increases for a sample of DB plans 
weighted to be representative of private DB plans.  Increases were legally required in “almost 
none” of the plans; nevertheless, between 1973 and 1979, 74.6 percent of retirees received at 2 
 
least one benefit adjustment, though only 24.5 percent received an increase each year.  Overall, 
benefits of sample members increased by 24 percent, which was about 40 percent of the CPI 
increase over the period.   Collectively bargained plans were about twice as likely as non-union 
plans to provide increases. ACS conclude that “the private pension system was much more 
responsive during the 1970s inflation than was previously believed.” 
  In a later paper, Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1992) found that, in a sample of  medium 
and large firms, the fraction of workers in plans making any post-retirement adjustments fell 
from 51 (1978-82) to 22 percent (1984-88).  The fraction of CPI inflation offset by benefit 
adjustments was 10-30 percent, depending on starting and ending date.  While the difference in 
samples makes exact comparisons difficult, the frequency of adjustments and the fraction of 
inflation offset appear lower than a decade earlier.  Gustman and Steinmeier (1993a), in contrast, 
found that pension recipients in PSID saw adjustments that were about half of the CPI increase in 
both 1971-79 and 1979-87.  Mitchell (1999) reported that frequency of adjustments continued to 
decline through the mid-1990s, but did not calculate the size of those adjustments. 
  Government pensions are more likely to be adjusted after retirement and to be formally 
indexed to inflation (Weinstein, 1997).  But these adjustments compensated for only a fraction of 
inflation (Phillips, 1992), as caps result in less than full inflation protection. 
  With lower inflation rates since the inception of HRS, one might guess that the frequency 
of inflation adjustments has probably fallen, but there is no hard evidence available.  
Unfortunately, this does not mean that the effect of inflation on pension wealth and retirement 
income adequacy can be ignored.  As shown above, as life expectancies increase, the capacity of 
even modest inflation to erode the value of pension benefits is substantial. 3 
 
  Given the patchy evidence discussed so far, one might wonder what assumptions analysts 
make when calculating pension wealth – i.e., the present value of future benefit flows.  Often, it 
is hard to tell.  But in papers where the issue is explicitly addressed, either relying on the ACS 
estimate (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993 and 2000; Evan and McPherson, 2007), or 
ignoring such adjustments altogether (Mehdizadeh and Luzadis, 1994; Samwick, 1998) seem to 
be the most common alternatives. 
Data 
  The data for this study are taken from the Health and Retirement Study. The HRS began 
as a longitudinal study of those who were 51 to 61 in 1992 (i.e., the 1931-41 birth cohorts) and 
their spouses regardless of age.  In 1993, the Aging and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) study first 
interviewed a sample of those born before 1923; in 1998 the AHEAD sample as well as samples 
of those born in 1923-1930, and 1942-47 were added – at which point HRS included all those 
age 51 or older.  In 2004, those born in 1948-54 – i.e., those who had turned 51 since 1998 were 
added. 
  The key variable of interest is the amount received from pension plans other than 
Social Security or Veterans pensions.  The question sequence from HRS 2008 is included as 
Appendix A, with minor changes this sequence has been used since 1994 (the 1992 HRS and 
1983 AHEAD waves were much different and are not included in this paper).  If the respondents 
are married, the information is obtained, for both partners, from the financially knowledgeable 
respondent.  For simplicity, I will focus on the “version” of the question that is used in single-
person households (or in asking the financially knowledgeable respondent about his/her own 
pension).  The interviewer first asks “Not including Social Security or other retirement income 4 
 
you've already told me about, are you [or your] [husband/wife/partner] currently receiving any 
other income from retirement pensions?”  If the answer is affirmative, the interviewer asks 
whether our respondent, his/her spouse, or both are receiving pension income, and from how 
many pension plans.  For each respondent, a sequence of questions is then asked about up to two 
(if more than two, the two most important) plans.  For our purposes, the most important question 
is “How much did you receive last month from that pension, (before taxes and other 
deductions)?”  We focus on the “most important” plan for respondents receiving benefits from 
more than one, though these respondents account for only about 10 percent of the sample.   
  One complication is that those receiving benefits from either a DB or a DC plan can 
answer this pension sequence.  While our primary interest is in payments from DB plans, we will 
present results for both DB and DC benefits.  The difficulties that respondents have in 
understanding and/or explaining basic features of their pensions (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004; 
Chan and Stevens, 2008) will make it difficult to isolate DB plans with complete precision. 
 
Biennial Changes in Pension Benefits 
 
  Given that HRS is conducted in even-numbered years (except for the pre-1998 
AHEAD interviews) and asks only about current pension benefits, the most frequent changes we 
can track are those that occur between waves – i.e., over roughly two-year periods.  In Table 1, 
we present summary statistics for such changes, weighted by the end-year sample weight.  At the 
top of each column, we identify the years over which the change is computed, and, for reference, 
the proportional change in the CPI for those years. In the top panel, we include all pairs of years 
for which positive pension benefits are reported.  The pension changes average about two 5 
 
percent across all year-pairs in the table, while the SSA CPI-driven adjustments average 5.4 
percent, but there is quite a bit of variation from column to column, and the first two values are 
implausible.  While we expect the true adjustments are a combination of zeros (when benefits are 
not adjusted) and a few percent (when they are) the standard deviations of the changes are much 
larger than a back-of-envelope calculation would expect.   
  The large standard deviations and occasionally implausible means raise concerns about 
the importance of outliers in the data. Ordinarily, concern about outliers would lead one to focus 
on medians as well as (or perhaps instead of) means.  However, the median wave-to-wave 
change in pension benefits in our data is almost always zero – a reflection of the fact that true 
changes are small and respondents’ rounding of monthly amounts. An alternative is to simply 
eliminate extreme outliers.  In the second panel, we eliminate cases where reported benefits more 
than doubled, or fell by more than half (i.e., cases where |Δ ln benefit|>ln(2). This has a small 
effect on the sample size – typically we lose 4-5 percent of the observations – but the sample 
standard deviations are only a half to a third as large.  Tightening our criteria further, by 
excluding cases where |Δ ln monthly benefit|>ln(1.5) brings the mean for 1994-1996 to a more 
plausible value (.015) but has virtually no effect for other years.   
  A slightly different strategy for dealing with outliers is to delete a fixed percentage of 
the observations from each tail of the distribution of reported values.  In the third panel of Table 
1, we show the results when 5 percent of the observations are deleted from each tail.  This 
increases the reported adjustments very slightly (the mean adjustment across all pairs of adjacent 
interviews rises to 2.2 percent). 6 
 
  Deleting changes in cases where respondents reported more than one benefit in one or 
both years also made almost no difference, as can be seen from the bottom three panels of Table 
1.  This should not be surprising, as the deleted cases are only about 10 percent of the sample. 
  While we have no good way to validate the reported values, we can conduct a very 
similar analysis for Social Security benefits, where the annual adjustments mirror December to 
December CPI changes, and so true changes are “known.”
1
  Suppose that reports of pension benefits are about as accurate as reports of Social 
Security benefits, and all of the reported variation in the latter is error.  In this case, comparing 
the sample variances of the two variables suggests that 50-60 percent of the reported variation in 
pension benefits is measurement error, and the remaining 40 percent is true variation. 
  In Table 2, wave-to-wave changes in 
Social Security benefits are reported, for those receiving them.  Several patterns that were 
evident in the analysis of private pension benefits re-appear: the sample standard deviations for 
the full samples are quite large, and are dramatically reduced by eliminating a handful of 
outliers.  Still, there is considerable variability across respondents for a variable for which we are 
confident true changes are the same for a substantial majority.  Looking across all the columns of 
the table, in the first panel reported increases average 4.9 percent while the CPI-based increases 
average 5.4 percent.  Eliminating outliers reduces the average reported increase to 4.7 percent.  
Table 2 thus confirms that changes in individual reports of Social Security benefits are noisy, but 
on average seem accurate.   
 
                                                           
1 A few changes in an individual’s Social Security benefits will be due to other factors.  For example, a widow or 
widower may be entitled to survivor’s benefits based on their his or her spouse’s earnings records, resulting in a 
one-time increase that would exceed the CPI change.  Alternatively, an individual whose benefits are reduced 
because of earnings will have benefit changes that depend on changes in earnings as well as changes in the CPI.   7 
 
Changes Over the HRS Sample Period 
  A standard response to the noisiness of “change” measures in survey data is to focus on 
changes over a longer period of time.  This allows for greater variability in the true value or 
“signal”, while (on reasonable assumptions) not increasing the measurement error or “noise”.  
One complication in applying this idea to HRS pension recipients is that the time period spanned 
by the respondent’s first and last (as of 2008 interview) benefit varies across respondents.  In 
response, we focus on the average annual increase, computed as  
benefits pension    positive  with  last wave   and first  between    years   of number 
benefit) pension  ln(first  benefit) pension  ln(last 
years ln
) pension ln( −
≡
∆
∆
 
For the full sample, the average annual adjustment is .014 (1.4 percent), while the average annual 
increase in CPI over the same period is .0256, so the effective indexing ratio (= benefit 
adjustment divided by CPI increase) is .54.  Thus, benefit adjustments are roughly half of what 
one would observe if benefits were completely indexed.
2
  All of the results so far refer to all respondents who report a monthly benefit from an 
employer-sponsored pension plan. However, for many purposes we are interested in the extent of 
inflation adjustments for defined benefit plans.  Under a DC plan, the monthly payout can be 
structured in various ways, but the present value of the benefits is equal to the value of the assets 
  If we eliminate observations for which 
|Δln(pension)| is greater than 2, the average annual benefit increase is .008, and the “effective 
indexing ratio” is .32.  Deleting five percent of values in each tail of the distribution gave an 
average adjustment of .014 (the full sample value), while the other outlier deletion rules in 
produced estimates closer to .008.   
                                                           
2 The CPI increase that corresponds to a particular pension benefit adjustment varies from observation to 
observation, and so the mean CPI increase, which is the denominator of the effective indexing ratio, varies slightly 
from cell to cell in Table 3.   8 
 
in the DC account, regardless of how payouts are specified.  For DB plans, in contrast, benefit 
adjustments represent real increases in pension wealth.  Thus, it would be useful to calculate the 
inflation adjustments for DB and DC plans separately. 
  Unfortunately, many pension plan participants apparently do not understand enough 
about their plans to accurately distinguish DB from DC plans (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004; 
Chan and Stevens, 2008), so several approaches to the problem of identifying respondents whose 
pension benefits come from DB plans will be considered.  In each wave, respondents currently 
receiving pension benefits are asked several questions about their benefits which provide indirect 
evidence on the DB/DC issue:  
“If you wanted to, could you choose to receive a larger or smaller amount from that 
pension next month?” 
“Could you withdraw some or all of the money from that pension plan this month?” 
Both of these questions should be answered “No” by those with DB plans; unless they have 
annuitized their benefits (annuities are covered elsewhere in the survey) they should be able to 
vary payouts or take a lump-sum payment from a DC plan.  Consistent with the importance of 
DB plans among those receiving benefits in the HRS age cohorts, the strong majority of those 
receiving benefits answer “No” to both questions in each survey year.  On the other hand, 
respondents may not realize that they have these options, or may learn about them at some point 
after beginning benefits.  Thus, any respondent who ever answers yes to either question is treated 
as a likely DC recipient, and any who consistently answer “No” to both questions in all waves 
are treated as likely DB recipients.  Perhaps surprisingly, dividing recipients in this way leads to 
almost identical increases in annual benefits for the two groups, which again is slightly smaller if 9 
 
one eliminates outliers.  However, there are relatively few pension recipients in these age cohorts 
who appear to be receiving DC pensions.  
  Another plan characteristic of interest is whether the benefits are automatically adjusted 
for inflation.  Those currently receiving benefits are asked:  
Is the pension payment automatically adjusted for changes in the cost of living? 
In Table 3, respondents are divided into three groups: those who answer “No” in both the first 
and last year in which they report benefits, those who answer “Yes” in both years, and those who 
answer “Yes” in one of these two years.  Annual benefit adjustments are larger for those who 
report automatic increases.  But there are two surprises.  First, adjustments are essentially zero 
for those who do not report having automatic adjustments, while adjustments for those who 
report such adjustments to be automatic are substantial.  Second, the fraction of the sample 
reporting automatic adjustments is higher than we should be getting if respondents are telling us 
about what is mandated by their plan.
3
Matching Pension Benefits to Prior Jobs 
  Instead, they appear to be responding “yes” for both 
mandated and “voluntary” increases.  While it is reassuring that those who report their benefits 
are adjusted do, in fact, report larger adjustments, it does not appear that respondents are 
equating “automatic” with “mandated by the plan’s provisions.” 
  When respondents report receiving benefits, these benefits are not automatically linked 
to a specific employer.  However, respondents are asked when they first received benefits, and 
their responses provide a strong clue as to which job(s) might have generated the benefits in 
question.  
                                                           
3 Weinstein (1997) reports that about half of state and local government DB participants were in plans that provided 
for automatic benefit adjustments, but this fraction was only about 4 percent in the private sector. 10 
 
  HRS asks new respondents who are working for pay about their current job, and those 
who are not working about their last job.  In addition, those who held previous jobs lasting five 
or more years are asked about whether they participated in a pension on that job, and relevant 
details are collected.  Each later wave collects information about the currently-held job. 
  We apply two “rules” for matching the pension benefits reported in the income section 
to a specific previous job from the employment section.  First, identify those jobs at which 
respondent reported participating in a pension plan that ended no later than the year in which 
pension benefits began.  If there is more than one such job, one rule selects the “longest” such 
job, while the other selects the “last” such job (typically, the one that ended in the year that 
benefits began).  Fortunately, in just over 90 percent of all cases, the “last” and “longest” jobs 
were the same.  Table 4 focuses on characteristics of the job based on the “longest” job rule. 
  The first line of Table 4 shows the post-retirement adjustments for workers whose 
pensions could be successfully matched to a prior job.  The 1993 and 1995 waves of AHEAD 
that were conducted separately from HRS did not ask about pension coverage on these jobs, so 
the pensions matched to prior jobs are coming from the HRS and not the AHEAD birth cohort.  
Comparing the first line of Table 4 (pensions matched to jobs) to the first line of Table 3 (all 
pensions) shows somewhat smaller benefit increases for the jobs we can match, though this 
difference is fairly small when outliers are removed. 
  The next section of Table 4 compares adjustments of DB and DC recipients, basing this 
distinction on the respondent’s characterization of the plan in the first interview after leaving that 
job.  One might hope that details of the pension plan would be particularly salient then.  Once 
again, the strong majority of those reporting pension benefits appear be drawing on DB plans, 
but there is very little difference in the adjustment of DB and DC benefits. 11 
 
  The third section of the table divides respondents into three broad industry groupings – 
manufacturing, public administration (which, unfortunately, is only a subset of public sector 
workers), and “other”.  There is no evidence of adjustments in manufacturing, while there are 
substantial adjustments in public administration, and smaller but still significant adjustments in 
the residual industrial category. 
  Another job characteristic that is often associated with high levels of pension coverage 
and more generous benefits is coverage by a collective bargaining agreement. In Table 4, 
however, we find no evidence of greater post-retirement adjustment in the pension benefits of 
those covered by union contracts.
4
Matching Pension Benefits to Prior Jobs 
   
  HRS attempted to obtain the Summary Plan Descriptions for respondents’ pension 
plans and code the provisions of these plans in a data base.  Almost all of the effort focused on 
jobs identified in 1992, 1998, and 2004, years in which new birth cohorts were brought into the 
sample.   In 1992 and 1998, HRS attempted to obtain SPDs for both current and previous jobs on 
which the respondent had a pension; in 2004 only current jobs were pursued.  Given that very 
few current jobs in 2004 would have led to two waves of pension benefit receipt by 2008 (the 
minimal requirement for calculating any benefit adjustment), we focused on the 1992 and 1998 
SPD coding efforts. 
  Having identified a job as the job likely responsible for the pension benefit that is being 
received, we then “looked up” that job in the file with pension plan provisions.  If a match was 
                                                           
4 HRS obtains union status information for jobs held at or after the baseline interview and for the most recent job 
held for those who are not employed at baseline, but not for earlier jobs. This results in a smaller sample size, and 
accounts for the slightly smaller mean adjustments for both union and non-union jobs compared to the larger sample 
of all matched jobs on the first line of Table 4.   12 
 
obtained, the summary plan description’s characterization of the plan as DB or DC was 
retained.
5
The last panel in Table 4 shows the benefit adjustment information for plans characterized as DB 
or DC based on the SPD information.  The DB-DC distinction is more accurate here than 
elsewhere, as it is based on actual plan documents.  Unfortunately, HRS was less successful in 
obtaining these documents for “past” jobs (which are likely to be DB) than for jobs that were in 
progress at time of interview; on the other hand, public sector employers were more cooperative, 
which would tend to increase the fraction of matched plans that are DB.  In any case, the DB 
majority is smaller among the matched plans.  But, once again, adjustments are very similar for 
DB and DC plans. 
 
Conclusions 
  The benefit adjustments in this study are based on taking log-differences of the 
monthly benefits reported by HRS respondents in each biennial interview.  As is often true of 
survey reports of income (or wealth) components, data that appear reasonable when one focuses 
on “levels” are much more noisy when expressed as first differences. Nonetheless, we can 
estimate mean adjustments with reasonable precision, particularly if we eliminate extreme 
outliers. 
  Post-retirement benefit adjustments experienced by HRS respondents averaged roughly 
a third of the corresponding increase in the CPI.  Because DB pensions are still the dominant 
type of pension for these cohorts of workers, and because DC plans appear to have similar-sized 
adjustments, the one-third estimate is likely close to the mark for DB plans -- and this estimate 
                                                           
5 If there was more than one matched plan, the benefits were coded as DB if any of the matched plans were DB 
plans (e.g., a DB and a supplemental DC). 13 
 
finds support for the subset of pensions we could link to DB/DC information based on summary 
plan descriptions.  Adjustments are largest in public administration, negligible in manufacturing, 
and modest but non-zero in other industries.  They are very similar in union and non-union 
sectors. 
  The importance of “mandatory” vs. “voluntary” adjustment is harder to assess.  Nearly 
all of the adjustments occur in pensions that respondents say are “automatically” adjusted for 
inflation, but there are too many reporting “automatic” adjustment for this to be taken as a 
synonym for “mandated” adjustment.  With a third to a half of respondents reporting such 
adjustments, and as actual adjustments were detectable for these respondents, it seems clear that 
post-retirement adjustments continued in the low-inflation environment of the past two decades. 
To be sure, the adjustments do not fully compensate for inflation, even for the respondents who 
report receiving them.  On the other hand, they are larger than might have been expected given 
that adjustments typically become less common when inflation is low (Weinstein, 1997) and that 
many employers are struggling to even fund the benefits that are legally required under their 
plans.14 
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Table 1 
Wave-to Wave Changes in Monthly Private Pension Benefits 
(Δ ln monthly benefit) 
 
    1994-
1996 
HRS 
1995-
1998 
AHEAD 
1996-
1998 
All 
1998- 
2000 
All 
2000-
2002 
All 
2002-
2004 
All 
2004-
2006 
All 
2006-
2008 
All 
Social Security COLA    0.053  0.075  0.049  0.038  0.060  0.035  0.067  0.055 
All Observations  Mean  -0.056  0.074  0.041  0.016  0.029  0.021  0.003  0.025 
  Std.err.  0.021  0.015  0.009  0.006  0.007  0.009  0.010  0.011 
  Std.dev.  0.574  0.413  0.305  0.359  0.384  0.494  0.498  0.546 
  N  736  722  1214  3099  2952  2760  2727  2457 
Delete |Δ ln pension|>2  Mean  -0.003  0.043  0.035  0.017  0.027  0.016  0.013  0.011 
  Std.err.  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003 
  Std.dev.  0.184  0.160  0.161  0.156  0.168  0.158  0.160  0.159 
  N  682  675  1176  2976  2814  2636  2612  2353 
Delete 5% of sample  Mean  -0.014  0.058  0.037  0.018  0.030  0.020  0.011  0.015 
from each tail  Std.err.  0.006  0.006  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  Std.dev.  0.166  0.139  0.106  0.104  0.120  0.113  0.112  0.106 
  N  663  651  1092  2773  2659  2490  2445  2276 
Only one pension  Mean  -0.061  0.078  0.046  0.015  0.030  0.021  0.006  0.026 
  Std.err.  0.022  0.016  0.009  0.007  0.007  0.010  0.010  0.012 
  Std.dev.  0.584  0.419  0.305  0.360  0.376  0.487  0.495  0.545 
  N  705  677  1135  2858  2705  2509  2444  2234 
Only one pension.  Mean  -0.004  0.045  0.037  0.015  0.029  0.017  0.013  0.010 
Delete |Δ ln pension|>2  Std.err.  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003 
  Std.dev.  0.183  0.160  0.157  0.154  0.164  0.156  0.159  0.157 
  N  654  633  1099  2741  2580  2397  2341  2149 
Only one pension,  Mean  -0.014  0.058  0.037  0.018  0.030  0.020  0.011  0.015 
Delete 5% of sample  Std.err.  0.006  0.006  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
from each tail  Std.dev.  0.166  0.139  0.106  0.104  0.120  0.113  0.112  0.106 
  N  663  651  1092  2773  2659  2490  2445  2276 
    
Table 2 
Wave-to Wave Changes in Monthly Social Security Benefits 
(Δ ln monthly benefit) 
 
    1994-
1996 
HRS 
1995-
1998 
AHEAD 
1996-
1998 
All 
1998- 
2000 
All 
2000-
2002 
All 
2002-
2004 
All 
2004-
2006 
All 
2006-
2008 
All 
Social Security COLA    0.053  0.075  0.049  0.038  0.060  0.035  0.067  0.055 
All Observations  Mean  0.035  0.103  0.039  0.035  0.064  0.025  0.034  0.059 
  Std.err.  0.031  0.010  0.010  0.005  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.008 
  Std.dev.  0.492  0.259  0.283  0.264  0.287  0.277  0.308  0.363 
  N  251  734  745  2694  2664  2568  2546  2353 
Delete |Δ ln pension|>2  Mean  0.059  0.086  0.034  0.040  0.053  0.027  0.031  0.047 
  Std.err.  0.009  0.005  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.003 
  Std.dev.  0.135  0.136  0.116  0.117  0.122  0.125  0.126  0.126 
  N  238  708  732  2635  2597  2504  2482  2292 
Delete 5% of sample  Mean  0.052  0.090  0.036  0.037  0.056  0.026  0.035  0.048 
from each tail  Std.err.  0.006  0.004  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002 
  Std.dev.  0.089  0.091  0.050  0.062  0.070  0.066  0.065  0.074 
  N  227  655  661  2403  2396  2300  2272  2117 
  
 
Table 3 
“Long Differences” 
Average Annual Increase between First and Last Pension Benefit 
(Δ ln monthly benefit)/(Δ years) 
by respondent reported benefit characteristics 
 
 
    All observations  |Δln(pension)|>2 excluded 
 
Group 
Mean of 
years
pension ln
∆
∆
 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
 
N 
Effective 
Indexing 
ratio 
Mean of 
years
pension ln
∆
∆
 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
 
N 
Effective 
Indexing 
ratio 
All Pensions    0.014  0.002  6604  0.535  0.008  0.001  5825  0.324 
By pension type
1  DB  0.013  0.002  4717  0.510  0.007  0.001  4237  0.281 
  DC  0.015  0.005  1887  0.595  0.011  0.001  1588  0.424 
By “automatic” adjustment  Yes  0.022  0.003  2098  0.859  0.018  0.001  1867  0.693 
  Yes/No  0.021  0.004  1298  0.815  0.012  0.001  1090  0.469 
  No  0.005  0.004  3193  0.203  0.001  0.001  2855  0.043 
 
Note: 
1“DC” = those who ever said they could adjust benefit or withdraw money; “DB” = all others.  
Table 4 
 “Long Differences” 
Average Annual Increase between First and Last Pension Benefit 
(Δ ln monthly benefit)/(Δ years) 
matched to pension-generating jobs
1 
 
    All observations  |Δln(pension)|>2 excluded 
 
Group 
Mean of 
years
pension ln
∆
∆
 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
 
N 
Effective 
Indexing 
ratio 
Mean of 
years
pension ln
∆
∆
 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
 
N 
Effective 
Indexing 
ratio 
All pensions matched to job    0.009  0.003  3688  0.328  0.007  0.001  3281  0.270 
By pension type
2  DB  0.007  0.003  2570  0.284  0.006  0.001  2292  0.230 
  DC  0.005  0.008  471  0.202  0.008  0.002  412  0.304 
By industry  Mfg.  -0.005  0.007  983  -0.182  -0.005  0.002  870  -0.175 
  PubAdm  0.016  0.006  442  0.605  0.017  0.003  394  0.672 
  Other  0.012  0.003  2086  0.458  0.009  0.001  1868  0.350 
By union coverage  Yes  0.006  0.003  1132  0.246  0.004  0.001  1028  0.138 
  No  0.005  0.004  1017  0.183  0.007  0.001  911  0.257 
By pension type (SPD)
3  DB  0.009  0.005  977  0.330  0.007  0.002  867  0.276 
  DC  0.007  0.006  893  0.271  0.008  0.002  802  0.291 
                   
                   
                   
                   
 
Note:  
1Matched to longest job with pension coverage that ended no later than year in which benefits began. 
 
2Based on respondent’s last report of plan type 
 
3Based on summary plan description from matched job 
 